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In July of 1826, several prominent Wall Street firms abruptly went bankrupt, amid scandalous revelations
of fraudulent financial practices by their management. Although mostly forgotten today, these events
represented a watershed in the early development of the corporation laws and investor protections
governing Wall Street: in the aftermath of the scandals, New York State enacted an extensive package
of legislation designed to protect the interests of investors. These statutes were some of the the very
first of their kind, and had a lasting influence. This paper analyzes the causes of the failures, and the
evolution of the law in response. The analysis highlights the critical role played by scandal-driven








When the history of the panic of 2008 is written, its ¯nal chapters will likely describe a major
restructuring of our legal and institutional framework for regulating ¯nancial ¯rms. Innovations in
lending practices, ¯nancial instruments, and investment vehicles that exploited defects in ¯nancial
regulations are commonly cited as important causes of the crisis. In response, there have been
calls for a new system of ¯nancial regulation, in order to prevent a recurrence of the practices
that led to the crisis.1 This suggests that the evolution of ¯nancial regulations is a game of cat
and mouse: regulations are imposed, then ¯rms innovate, and if the innovations result in failures
or scandals the regulations are updated and the cycle begins anew. The Sarbanes-Oxley \Public
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002," implemented in reaction to
the revelations associated with the failures of ¯rms such as Enron and Worldcom, might be seen as
the outcome of an earlier round of the game.
It is tempting to think of this dynamic between ¯nancial innovations and regulatory responses
as unique to our modern ¯nancial system, with its breathtaking sophistication and complexity. But
this dynamic is an old one|probably as old as the country itself. In fact it is probably a better
description of the earliest decades of the nineteenth century, which began with relatively little
regulation of any kind, and saw dramatic innovations in the ¯nancial practices of corporations.
The United States inherited only a rudimentary corporation law from England, and on crucial
questions|from the rights of stockholders and creditors to ¯nancial disclosures and accounting
practice|the law was initially slow to evolve and remained vague, or totally silent, well into the
nineteenth century.2 But in July of 1826, a momentous scandal occurred, which ultimately led the
state of New York to implement an extensive series of changes to its corporation laws to safeguard
the interests of the investors and creditors of Wall Street ¯rms. These statutes were some of the very
¯rst of their kind, and in°uenced corporation law in other states. The scandals also led to numerous
civil suits, and the decisions in some of these cases became signi¯cant precedents, including one
which created the foundation for the shareholder derivative suit.
1At this writing, most research into the causes of the crisis and proposals for regulatory reform are still quite
preliminary. But see, for example, Acharya and Richardson (2009) on \regulatory arbitrage" in the banking sector
and measures that could be adopted to reduce this. Likewise the ¯ndings of Benmelech and Dlugoz (2009) highlight
the potential role of ratings-based regulation of ¯nancial institutions in some of the practices that contributed to the
crisis.
2See, for example, Dodd (1954: 195-98), Gower (1956), and Williston (1888: 166).
1At the center of the scandal was the sudden failure in July of 1826 of six of the sixty-seven
companies whose shares were traded on the New York Stock Exchange; over the ensuing months,
another twelve NYSE ¯rms would succumb.3 Many of the ¯rms that failed were new ¯nancial
companies, whose shares had risen in value dramatically over 1824 and 1825. The founders of these
¯rms were quite aggressive in their ¯nancial practices, and rejected the conservative mode of oper-
ation of many of the older New York City banks. These men borrowed tremendous sums, acquired
¯rms through what would now be called hostile takeovers, and formed pyramid-like networks of
companies, whose resources they often utilized for their own bene¯t, rather than the other share-
holders'. In a market downturn that began in late 1825, the value of their assets fell precipitously,
and they resorted to fraudulent transactions among the companies they controlled to try to keep
them a°oat. Ultimately the investors and creditors of these ¯rms lost millions.
Once exposed, the conduct of the managers of these ¯rms shocked the public, and threatened
to erode con¯dence in the markets, and in the governance of all ¯nancial corporations. Newspaper
editorialists wrote of a \most extensive, bold, well-combined, and far reaching system of deception"
among the directors of many companies, and expressed concern that the prosperity of the city
would su®er if measures were not taken to prevent a recurrence of the scandals.4 Populist anger at
what was perceived as widespread \swindling" produced cries for criminal investigations, to punish
the \coldly calculating scoundrels" and clear away \the feculence of Wall Street."5 The district
attorney of New York City quickly obtained a series of indictments against the directors of many of
the failed companies for conspiracy, and the subsequent trials captivated the attention of the city
for months.
But these prosecutions were mostly unsuccessful, and the scandals of 1826 confronted the polit-
ical leadership of the State of New York with the realization that the laws and institutions in place
to protect the stockholders of corporations were no match for the practices developed by some of
the more aggressive ¯nancial ¯rms. One might term the events of 1826 a corporate governance
crisis, and in response a consensus quickly emerged that \laws must be made that will reach such
3Upon its formal founding in 1817, the New York Stock Exchange was known as the \New York Stock and
Exchange Board"; its name was shortened in 1863.
4New-York American, 14 August 1826.
5Niles' Register, 12 August 1826 and 29 July 1826; and Evening Post, 25 July 1826. At the time, Niles' Register
was among the most in°uential periodicals in the United States.
2cases."6 In the next legislative session, the state adopted a sweeping package of legislation designed
to improve the governance of corporations by prohibiting the manipulations brought to light in the
scandals, and introduced ¯nancial reporting requirements, rules governing the election of directors
and regulations of the acceptable forms for capital contributions, and new legal responsibilities for
directors. In addition, the jurisdiction of some of the state's courts was changed to make it easier
for aggrieved stockholders and creditors to pursue their claims, and to enable the state to enforce
its laws more e®ectively. In a re°ection of the outrage provoked by the scandals, some of the new
measures imposed on corporate directors were quite onerous, and were later rolled back when it
became clear that they might sti°e economic growth.
This paper analyzes the failures that became the focus of the \conspiracy trials" of 1826, and
the evolution of the law in response. Using newly-collected data on the ownership structures of
New York's publicly-traded corporations, which were matched to securities price data from NYSE
trading, I document the extent of the collapse in 1826, and analyze determinants of the failures.7 I
then trace out the evolution of the law in response to the scandals, including the statutory reforms
implemented by the state and the case law that emerged from the copious civil litigation initiated
by stockholders, and examine the relationship between these legal changes and the determinants
of the failures.
The ownership data was collected from the reports ¯led pursuant to New York State's capital
tax, which were matched to lists of corporate directors obtained from contemporary newspapers.8
The analysis of these data reveals that the directors of some NYSE ¯rms controlled blocks of
shares in their companies that were large enough to give them a majority of the votes. But more
importantly, some of the shares voted by the directors were actually treasury shares, often purchased
by the company from their own subscriptions. These shares, coupled with the blocks of stock held
through other corporations they controlled, created an incentive problem familiar today: the control
rights of directors often substantially exceeded their true ownership stakes.9 Unaccountable to the
6Niles' Register, 14 October 1826.
7The securities price data, reported as a percentage of par value, are collected in Sylla, Wilson and Wright (2005)
from contemporary newspapers. No volume data are available for this period.
8The capital tax of 1823-28 required all operating business corporations to submit a list of their stockholders to
the state's comptroller, so that the revenues could be distributed to the counties where the stockholders resided.
Many of these reports survive in the New York State Archives.
9See, for example, LaPorta et al (1999). The signi¯cance of this problem was observed by Berle and Means (1932),
who called it the \separation of ownership from control."
3other shareholders, these directors used their ¯rms' resources to make investments that bene¯tted
themselves, or other companies they controlled. In the data, the extent to which the directors'
control rights exceeded their ownership is strongly correlated with ¯rm failure. And many of the
legal reforms implemented in 1827 were intended to prevent directors from creating such ownership
arrangements.
The banking panics of the nineteenth century have been the focus of considerable scholarship.10
But there has been relatively little research into the events of 1826, which are mostly forgotten
today.11 In part, this is likely due to the fact that these events did not constitute a classic banking
crisis. Like the panic of 1907, which originated among trust companies, the crisis in 1826 began
outside the o±cial banking sector, with insurance corporations.12 Although devastating to the
stock market, the events of 1826 did not destabilize the banking system, possibly because of the
e®orts of the Second Bank of the United States to aid New York City's banks.13 Works of ¯nancial
history have therefore generally not analyzed them in much detail.14
The history and evolution of the law has attracted renewed interest by economists, in part
because of the relationship that has been found between the historical origins and modern perfor-
mance of legal systems across countries.15 Several recent contributions to this literature have begun
to develop a positive theory of the evolution of common law, and have analyzed the relationship
between statute law and judicial lawmaking.16 This paper compliments those works by analyzing
an important episode in the evolution and Americanization of the corporation law that prevails
here.17 As Angell and Ames noted in 1832, \the statute books of many states will show that an
10See Calomiris and Gorton (2000), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Kindleberger (1996), and Rocko® (2000).
11Three exceptions are Riesman's (1989) analysis of the politics of the scandals; Wright's (1997) study of banks
and politics in New York, which provides a detailed account of one of the criminal trials that followed; and Govan's
(1959) biography of Nicholas Biddle, which mentions some of the failures. A companion paper, Hilt (2009), describes
in detail the operations of the most prominent company that failed, Life and Fire Insurance.
12On the panic of 1907, see Moen and Tallman (1992), and Odell and Weidenmeir (2004).
13Although the Second Bank of the U.S. did act somewhat like a lender of last resort in this context, it did not
generally ful¯ll the role of a true central bank. See Temin (1969).
14For example, important banking histories, such as Bodenhorn (2003), Hammond (1957) or Van Fenstermaker
(1965), mostly do not discuss these events. Likewise, histories of ¯nancial crises, such as Kindelberger (1996) and
Chancellor (2000), and histories of the Second Bank of the U.S., such as Catterall (1903) and Temin (1969), discuss
the panic of 1825 in Britain, which precipitated the crisis in the U.S., but do not discuss the events analyzed in this
paper.
15For an overview of this literature, see La Porta, et al. (2008), and the references cited therein.
16On the evolution of common law, see Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007). On the relationship with statute law, see
Ponzetto and Fernandez (2008), and Glaeser and Shleifer (2003).
17Some British commentators would mock the \in¯nity of regulations for the prevention of fraud" adopted by
the American states, believing their own system of simply denying limited liability and corporate privileges to most
¯nancial companies to be superior (McCulloch, 1836: 435). For comparative perspectives on the development of
4opinion has strongly and extensively prevailed that the common law relative to commercial cor-
porations is not adequate to their proper regulation and government."18 The events described in
this paper were responsible for some of the statutes noted by Angell and Ames, and led the courts,
through their much slower process, to innovate as well.
2 Historical context: corporation law and securities markets
In contrast to other areas of the law, the United States did not inherit a well-developed set of legal
precedents relating to business corporations from England.19 The growing use of the corporate
form in the American states led to the development of an indigenous corporation law, as courts
took up questions regarding the rights of these organizations and their stockholders and creditors,
and as the states sought to regulate the enterprises they incorporated. But the development of
corporation law was gradual, whereas the proliferation of business corporations was quite rapid.
2.1 Early New York corporation law
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, the states began to incorporate unprecedented
numbers of businesses. By the 1820s, thousands of American businesses corporations had been
created, and a small but growing number of these ¯rms had publicly traded equity shares.20 The
growing use of the corporate form was particularly pronounced in New York, which incorporated
more business than any other state in the years up through 1830. The cumulative total of New York
incorporations over this period is illustrated in ¯gure 1. The state went from having only one bank,
one manufacturing corporation, and no insurance corporations in 1791 to having incorporated more
than 1,000 businesses in 1830, including 150 ¯nancial companies.
the corporation generally, see, for example, North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), Gower (1956), and Lamoreaux and
Rosenthal (2005).
18p. 357. Angell and Ames's volume was the ¯rst American treatise on the law of corporations.
19See, for example, Dodd (1954), Gower (1956) and Hurst (1970). Harris (2000: 117-18) notes that many funda-
mental questions relating to the rights of stockholders in corporations were not adjudicated by English courts until
the 1820s. As many have pointed out, a striking illustration of the state of English corporation law at the end of
the eighteenth century is found in Kyd's Treatise on the Law of Corporations, which is concerned almost exclusively
with charitable and municipal corporations (Kyd 1793). Likewise Blackstone's Commentaries includes relatively few
details on corporations (Blackstone 1791).
20The total number of business incorporations in the United States for any year after 1800 is not known, but the
data in Davis (1917), Evans, (1948) and Kessler (1948) indicate that well in excess of two thousand businesses were
chartered through 1825 in the large but incomplete group of states covered by those volumes. Rousseau and Sylla
(2005) analyze the early development of American securities markets.
5Figure 1:
Cumulative Incorporations of Businesses in New York, 1790-1830
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Source: Author's calculations from New York Laws, 1790-1830, and New York Comptroller's records, New York State
Archives. Note: Totals include incorporations through New York's 1811 general incorporation act for manufacturing ¯rms.
\Financial ¯rms" includes banks, insurance companies, and a very small number of loan companies. New York granted
one business charter prior to 1790, to the Bank of North America (1782), but the bank never operated under that charter.
These businesses quickly began to innovate in their ¯nancial practices and organization, and on
many crucial questions relating to the rights of stockholders and creditors, the law was slow to keep
pace. For example, no New York statute or reported case before the 1820s addressed the voting
rights of pledged or \hypothecated" shares, of recently transferred shares, or of treasury shares; the
question of what constitutes a quorum at shareholders or directors meetings; or voting by proxy.
And although the courts recognized that ¯duciary law law applied to corporate directors, attempts
by minority shareholders to hold directors accountable for misconduct|what we now know of as
the stockholder derivative suit|had never been pursued successfully.21
There were few statutes intended to protect stockholders or creditors. In general, the legislature
had been reluctant to intervene in the internal a®airs of corporations, and legislation proposed to
de¯ne or protect the rights of stockholders was usually rejected.22 In this era of \special charters"
21New York's Chancellor stated that ¯duciary law applied to directors in Attorney General v. Utica Insurance Co.,
2 Johns Ch. 371 (N.Y. 1817). However, as Dodd (1954: 71) notes, \no court of equity between 1800 and 1830 seems
to have had occasion to give relief against corporate directors on the ground that they had violated their ¯duciary
duties."
22For example, a proposal in early 1826 to grant investors holding at least 1% of a corporation's shares the right
6granted to corporations, whatever legally enforceable rights were available to shareholders were
mostly those speci¯ed within the charters themselves, which varied widely across ¯rms. There were
no general ¯nancial reporting requirements, accounting standards, or statutes regulating capital
contributions or ¯nancial practices. The state did, of course, impose some regulations on politically
sensitive industries, such as banking. But an early attempt by the attorney general to enforce a
banking statute by seeking an injunction against a corporation that °outed the law was rejected
by the chancellor, who held that the court of chancery did not have the requisite jurisdiction over
business corporations.23 Thus the few statutes in place could not be enforced with injunctions.24
Rather than law, traditions and norms probably dictated most of the procedures that were
followed in the governance and operations of business corporations. But the 1820s saw the emer-
gence of a new generation of entrepreneurs whose aggressive ¯nancial practices departed from these
norms and traditions. These entrepreneurs' e®orts were aided by a boom in the stock market in
the middle of the decade.
2.2 The stock market boom of 1824-25
After experiencing a traumatic banking crisis in 1819, the early 1820s saw interest rates fall to
historically low levels in the United States.25 A rage for shares in new ¯nancial companies swept
over Wall Street in 1824 and 1825. The boom in New York's securities markets was at least partially
stimulated by events in England, which experienced something of a speculative mania in the shares
of new companies in those years. In total, some 624 English companies were °oated in 1824 and
to fully inspect all the books and property of that business, and to make hypothecated stock ineligible to vote, was
rejected in the New York Assembly, 60 to 26, as one legislator remarked that \it was as well to let the Wall-street
folks shave in their own way, without legislative interference." New York Commercial Advertiser, 15 February 1826.
Hurst (1970) concludes that more legislative \attention was directed to the external than to the internal or close
relations of business corporations" (p. 48).
23More precisely, the court held that it did not have visitorial jurisdiction over business corporations|that is, it
could not inquire into their conduct or act to supervise or control them in order to prevent abuses. Attorney General
v. Utica Insurance Co., 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 371 (N.Y. 1817). An injunction is an equitable remedy, meaning that it
could only be granted by courts of equity (chancery courts); law courts did not have that power. Over the nineteenth
century, states without chancery courts granted equity jurisdiction to their law courts by statute. See, for example,
Curran (1951).
24The advantage of injunctions is that they can forbid or compel speci¯c acts|in the case of a corporation suspected
of fraud, for example, an injunction could be used to halt their operations. On equity jurisdiction over corporations,
see Pound (1936).
25On the panic of 1819, see Rothbard (1956). Homer and Sylla (1996) document that yields on federal government
debt fell from 5.9% in 1819 to 4.25% in 1824.
71825; at the time, there were 156 joint-stock companies in existence there.26
During those years, New York's legislature was overwhelmed with petitions for charters of in-
corporation for ¯nancial companies. At the commencement of the 1825 legislative session, 146 such
petitions awaited the Assembly and Senate, which collectively would have created ¯rms with a total
capital of $52 million.27 (At the time, the total capital of all operating corporations with ¯nancial
powers was less than $40 million). Although the incorporated banks in the state e®ectively opposed
most e®orts to create new banks, the legislature did grant charters to seven new banks in 1824 and
1825. More dramatic was the number of insurance corporations created. In 1824 and 1825, New
York chartered 30 insurance companies, and another ¯ve \lombard" or loan companies. Because
they did grant the legal authority to issue banknotes, bills to incorporate insurance companies
were less politically contentious. But insurance ¯rms did have the power to lend, and aggressive
entrepreneurs who could not obtain bank charters often sought insurance charters so that they
could operate these ¯rms as quasi-banks.28
Figure 2 presents these new ¯nancial incorporations in their historical context. Total annual
incorporations generally rose over time, accelerating in the years of the War of 1812, and brie°y
collapsing in the years after the Panic of 1819. The annual number of ¯nancial incorporations
increased following the expiration of the charter of the Bank of the United States in 1811, and
then accelerated in the 1820s, in spite of e®orts to curtail the rate at which these corporations were
created.29 The years 1824 and 1825 saw an unprecedented surge in ¯nancial incorporations. This
was due both to the increase in demand for charters, but also to a political shift in the legislature,
which became somewhat more willing to grant ¯nancial charters.30 As a result of the scandals that
26See English (1827: 31). A booming market for Latin American debt securities in London preceded this surge in
the market for shares in English companies; see Dawson (1990). The British speculative mania of 1825 is analyzed
in great detail by Hunt (1936). On the role of the Bank of England, see Neal (1998).
27Shipping and Commercial List, 2 February 1825.
28At the time, there was no government-issued paper money, and the issuance of banknotes was a lucrative practice
by banks. On the politics of bank chartering, see Bodenhorn (2006), Hammond (1957), and Wright (1997). Hilt (2009)
presents the history of the e®orts to use insurance charters to circumvent New York's banking laws.
29Article 7, section 9 of the New York Constitution of 1821 imposed the requirement of a two-thirds majority
for grants of charters. Kent (1826) laments that this measure \failed to mitigate the evil" of the proliferation of
corporations, among which ¯nancial corporations were the most controversial. Incorporation in manufacturing was
facilitated by the state's 1811 general incorporation act for manufacturing companies. On the use of this act, see
Kessler (1940).
30The \People's Party," whose backers included many businessmen hoping for corporate charters, won many seats
from the Albany Regency (the dominant faction of the New York Republican Party) in 1824. See Hanyan (1996).
Opponents of the People's Party claimed that it sent \a body of men unaccustomed to legislation, and ¯lled with
crude and speculative schemes" into o±ce after winning the election of 1824 (New-York Enquirer, 6 November 1826).
8Figure 2:
Annual Incorporations of Businesses in New York, 1790-1830
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Source: Author's calculations from New York Laws, 1790-1830, and New York Comptroller's records, New York State
Archives. Note: \Financial ¯rms" includes banks, insurance companies, and a small number of loan companies, which like
insurance companies had the power to lend, but did not have the power to issues banknotes.
followed, 1826 and 1827 saw a collapse in ¯nancial incorporations.
The ¯rst half of 1825 saw the peak of the mania, and the subscription books for new ¯nancial
companies were opened to overwhelming responses.31 The demand for new issues was so intense
that riots broke out in front of subscription o±ces, as investors scrambled to add their names.32
Noting the credulous attitudes of investors toward the new companies, Niles' Register observed,
\it is strange that no sort of madness can break out in England, without a®ecting us in the United
States. ... Now we have it in stock companies. There will be a smash|equal to that caused by the
blowing up of the banks some time ago."33 The predicted \smash" did indeed arrive, later that
year.
It began in England. In the middle of 1825, the Bank of England began what was e®ectively a
31The \New York Water Works," a ¯rm with a plan to lobby the legislature to obtain banking powers, received
orders for shares totaling more than nine million dollars, whereas its capital stock was limited to one and a half million
(Niles' Register, 22 April 1825). Niles also reported that the New York Dry Dock company, a ¯rm that would later
successfully lobby to obtain banking powers, received subscriptions for more than 2 million dollars for its $700,000
capital stock (4 June 1825), and the Commercial Bank of Albany received subscriptions of $1,500,000 for its $300,000
in shares (11 June 1825).
32Niles' Register, 7 May 1825.
337 May, 1825. Italics in original.
9monetary contraction, and in December, several private banks failed, triggering a general collapse
in English share prices, and ultimately a deep ¯nancial crisis.34 With many American merchants
and banks, especially those in New York, maintaining close ¯nancial ties to their counterparts in
Britain, the panic there created tighter monetary conditions here in late 1825 and early 1826. A
related mechanism which triggered the crisis in England and New York was a collapse in cotton
prices. A rapid increase in the price of this commodity|America's largest export|in late 1824
was followed by a collapse in mid-1825, causing ¯nancial ruin among many merchants who lent to
¯nance the cotton trade.35
There was no generalized banking crisis in the United States, however, at least in part because
the Second Bank of the United States worked assiduously with its New York branch to provide
credit to the banking community there.36 Although some small country banks in upstate New
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut either failed or suspended payment on their notes in late 1825,
in general New York's banking system withstood the pressures of that year reasonably well.37 The
tighter ¯nancial conditions in New York did, however, end the period of \wild and exaggerated
speculation" in New York's ¯nancial markets, which had further repercussions.38
Figure 3 illustrates the total market value of the equity of New York corporations traded on
the New York Stock Exchange from 1817, the year it was o±cially organized, through 1830. The
upper panel of the ¯gure shows that total market values increased dramatically from early 1824
up until it reached a peak in mid-1825, rising 60% over this period. This increase in value was
driven almost entirely by the addition of new companies to the market, and the rising value of those
34At the time, the Bank of England did not function as a true central bank, and it e®ected this contraction out
of concerns over its falling gold reserves, and with little regard for the consequences for the British ¯nancial system.
See Neal (1998).
35The price of upland cotton in New York rose from around $0.15/lb. in late 1824 to around $0.25/lb. in mid-1825,
and subsequently collapsed to about $0.15/lb. again by early 1826 (data in Cole, 1938). One of the directors of the
New York branch of the Bank of the United States noted, \many ... are brought to the verge of ruin by the purchase
of bills drawn by Cotton shippers" (Robert Lenox to Nicholas Biddle, 9 November 1825, Nicholas Biddle Papers).
36The correspondence between Nicholas Biddle, President of the SBUS, and Robert Lenox, throughout 1825 reveals
that Biddle monitored ¯nancial conditions in New York quite carefully, and in response to the pressure from Britain
shifted resources to the New York branch, and increased the bank's loans in that city. See, for example, correspondence
with Lenox on 7, 8, and 23 December, 1825 (Nicholas Biddle Papers, Library of Congress Micro¯lm). Biddle
maintained later that his actions saved the nation from serious losses; see Catterall (1903). The New York American
commended the Bank of the U.S. for its conduct during the crisis (27 October 1826). However, as Temin (1969)
argues, the Second Bank of the U.S. in general did not perform the role of a true central bank, because its e®orts to
discipline the note issuance of state banks limited its ability to increase the supply of liquid assets in crises.
37Niles' Register mentions the failure of the Eagle Bank of New Haven in October, 1825, the Lombard and Derby
banks of New Jersey in November, and the Banks of Niagra and Plattsburg in December.
38This is the characterization of Nicholas Biddle. Biddle to Isaac Lawrence, 12 May 1825 (Nicholas Biddle Papers).
10Figure 3:
NYSE, 1817-1830: Market Value and Number of Traded Stocks
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Note: Top: Author's calculations of market value (number of paid-in shares £ par value £ market price, in % of par value)
for all New York corporations traded on the New York Stock & Exchange Board. Only corporations where transactions
were recorded in two or more quarters were included. Because many shares traded infrequently, the average value over
each quarter is used (rather than end-of-quarter data, which would be missing for many quarters for some companies.)
The number of paid-in shares is taken from the records of the New York Comptroller, New York State Archives, Albany
NY. The par value of the shares is from the corporate charters, in New York's Laws, 1790-1830. Finally, the market
prices, expressed as a percentage of par value, are from Sylla, Wilson and Wright (2005). Bottom: number of stocks, and
insurance stocks, used in the market value calculations in the upper ¯gure.
11new companies' shares, rather than through appreciations of the shares of existing companies.39
The ¯gure then shows a consistent fall in market values that continued through 1829. The lower
part of the ¯gure illustrates the importance of newly-listed companies, and in particular insurance
companies, for both the upward and downward movements in the market. The increase in the
number of insurance companies accounted for about two-thirds of the total increase in traded
stocks from 1824 through 1825. Then over the subsequent years, the number of traded stocks fell
again, and much of this decline was driven by the disappearance of insurance ¯rms.
Most of the ¯rms that stopped trading were liquidated after su®ering heavy losses. In some
cases, particularly for ¯rms with large amounts of liquid liabilities, their failures occurred quite
quickly, and their shares abruptly halted trading. In other cases, ¯rms continued to operate for
some time, and as investors learned of the true condition of their ¯nances, their shares fell in value.
Appendix table A1 (at the end of the paper) lists the New York companies whose shares were
traded on the NYSE at the time, and identi¯es the ¯rms that failed.
3 The ¯nances and failures of the new ¯rms
Some of the men who founded the new ¯nancial companies of the 1820s were wealthy and politically
prominent merchants, but others were stock brokers or speculators, including some of \doubtful
means."40 Together, they represented a new generation of ¯nanciers, and they broke with estab-
lished practices in the ¯nancing of their companies.
3.1 Innovations in ¯nancial practice
When a new ¯nancial company was formed, it was accepted practice for stockholders to borrow
some portion of the value of their subscriptions from the company after the shares were paid in.
These loans were known as \stock notes," and were relatively common among banks and insurance
companies.41 The men who founded the new ¯nancial companies of the 1820s exploited this form of
39The total value of companies chartered prior to 1823 rose about 8% in total over 1824 and 1825.
40New York American, 14 August 1826. Among the wealthy merchants were Henry Eckford and Alfred Pell, who
were taxed at $100,000 or above in 1828, placing them among the sixty wealthiest people in New York City at the
time. (Tax data from Pessen, 1973). Eckford and Pell were leading members of one faction of New York's Republican
party, and Pell won election to the State Assembly (Hanyan 1996). But neither was ever in°uential enough to obtain
bank charters.
41Hammond (1957) describes this practice among early banks, and notes that even the federal government's in-
vestment in the Bank of the United States was lent back in this way (p. 123). See also Bodenhorn (2003), Knodell
12lending to acquire and maintain total control over their ¯rms. They would subscribe to a majority
of the shares, and pay for them with loans from other institutions.42 At the ¯rst shareholders'
meeting, they would then vote themselves into o±ce as directors. This would give them control
over the ¯rm's resources, and once in o±ce they would simply lend themselves back the amount
of their investment, and repay the initial loan.43 Critics of these ¯rms would later argue that this
was an era of banking on stock notes, rather than sound capital.44 In some cases, these stock
notes were ultimately cancelled by returning the shares to the company. But the directors typically
then placed the shares in a trust for the company and named themselves or their allies trustees, or
held them in the name of the president of the company. In either case, they continued to vote the
shares.45
Once they commenced operations, many of the new ¯rms functioned as quasi-banks. Indeed,
some were founded simply to enable merchants who could not obtain a bank charter to enter the
lucrative banking industry. Several of the new insurance corporations made short-term loans by
issuing securities that were similar to banknotes, known at the time as \bonds."46 Some of the
insurance companies created in 1824 and 1825 issued large amounts of these instruments to ¯nance
loans to speculators, and were unable to redeem them when the stock market collapsed and their
loans became worthless. In this sense, the collapse of some of these ¯rms follows the familiar pattern
of banking crises, where excessive issuance of notes by undercapitalized institutions ultimately lead
to failure.
But the conduct of the directors of the new ¯nancial companies was innovative and perhaps even
unprecedented in other respects. Securities trading on Wall Street had become quite sophisticated,
(2006), and Lamoreaux (1994).
42In the context of a booming market for these securities, the price of the shares would be expected to rise above
the (par) value that was paid for them, so loans of this kind could be readily obtained.
43An example of this practice, as utilized by the directors of the Mohawk Insurance Company at its founding in
1824, is described in detail in Nathan v. Whitlock, 9 Paige 152 (N.Y. 1841). Testimony at the criminal trial of the
directors of the U.S. Lombard Association, as reported in the Evening Post, 22 December 1826, indicated that similar
practices were followed in the founding of that ¯rm.
44Flagg (1868: 4). Allegations of banking on \¯ctitious capital" were nothing new; Thomas Je®erson had written
that \three fourths" of the capital of the banks was ¯ctitious at the time of the panic of 1819 (Letter to Richard
Rush, 22 June 1819, in Ford (ed.) (1905). The uses to which these ¯nancing techniques were put in the 1820s is what
made those years di®erent.
45Voting such shares was later held to be illegal (Ex parte Holmes 5 Cow 426 (NY Sup. Ct. 1826)), but this
practice seems to have been common nonetheless.
46These instruments are best characterized as post notes, and unlike banknotes, which were payable on demand
in specie, they were payable to order at some future date. Hilt (2009) analyzes the use of these instruments, and
presents a description of the transactions by which they were issued. The history of the post note is described in
Redlich (1944).
13and these brokers and merchants used the ample credit available in securities markets to purchase
large blocks of stock in ¯rms, often resulting in bitter contests for control.47 Critics of these
men bemoaned what they saw as the takeover of ¯nancial ¯rms by speculators: \sundry stock
brokers...backed by their wealthy friends, have long itched to get the ascendancy over our moneyed
institutions; and having selected the company in question, commenced putting the \screws" to
the directors."48 Once they held a majority of the shares in a corporation, they would vote for
themselves, along with men who could be trusted not to interfere with their plans, as directors.
And once control over a corporation's resources was obtained, it could then be used as collateral
to borrow in order to ¯nance additional acquisitions.49 Through such transactions, groups of
speculators were able to obtain control, or at least signi¯cant in°uence, in relatively large numbers
of corporations.
Figure 4 depicts the holdings of four prominent investors, and the companies they controlled.50
With large or majority stakes ensuring that their control would be di±cult or impossible to contest,
these men utilized the ¯rms' resources for their own bene¯t, and \sacri¯ced the interest and property
of the [other] stockholders."51 Consider their acquisition of the stake in City Bank, one of the largest
banks in New York City. In this audacious transaction, they purchased 16,000 (64%) of City Bank's
shares, using $80,000 of N.Y. Coal's assets as payment, which amounted to 10% of the par value
of the shares purchased. They borrowed the remaining amount, approximately $760,000, with the
City Bank shares as collateral. The City Bank shares, and the debt for the the balance of the cost
of the purchase, stood on the books of New York Coal. But since they controlled the majority of
the shares of New York Coal, three of them voted themselves directors of City Bank. In late 1825
and early 1826, the price of City Bank stock began to fall, and the shares eventually had to be sold
47Two such cases produced signi¯cant litigation, because the incumbent directors used illegal tactics to disqualify
the shares held by the speculators from voting. One such case involved the North River Bank of New York City
(People ex rel. Barker v. Kip, 4 Cow. 382 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822)), and the other involved Frankin Insurance (People
ex rel. Israel v. Tibbets, 4 Cow. 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825)). On trading in securities markets in the early-nineteenth
century, see Werner and Smith (1991), Banner (1998), and Wright (2002).
48New-York National Advocate, 22 January 1825. The editor of this paper, Mordecai M. Noah, labelled one group
of speculators the \Screw Party," for putting the screws on directors in this way.
49These transactions resembled the process of acquisitions that would later be used to create \chain banking"
structures in the early twentieth century. See, for example, Bruner and Carr (2007) and Tallman and Moen (1990).
This is also quite similar to the \double gearing" between Japanese banks and insurance companies described by
Hoshi and Kayshap (2004:16), wherein banks raise capital by selling securities to insurance companies, but then use
the capital to buy securities from insurance companies, producing an increase in reported capital for both ¯rms.
50A few additional cross holdings of less than 5% ownership are not depicted in the ¯gure.
51Bill of complaint, 5 August 1826, Robinson v. Smith, New York County Clerk's O±ce, ref. R911. This suit was
initiated by the stockholders of New York Coal against the directors of the ¯rm in August 1826.
14Figure 4:
Ownership Stakes, Four Investors
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Note: At least one of the four men held a directorship in all of the companies in the ¯gure, and contemporary journalists
characterized the banks and insurance companies as under their control. No stockholder list could be found for Franklin
Fire Insurance or Jersey Bank.
to repay the loan. The stockholders of New York Coal lost about $50,000 on the transaction.52
The controlling investors also moved assets among their various companies to suit their needs, in
exchanges that were often hostile to the interests of the other stockholders of the ¯rms. For example,
beginning in late 1825, when a severe contraction in credit markets began, Jersey Bank's ¯nances
came under pressure. In an e®ort to keep this ¯rm a°oat, the controlling investors exchanged some
of the assets of their healthier companies for assets of Jersey Bank that were of dubious value.
They exchanged $40,000 worth of the assets of the Steam Saw Mill Association for shares of stock
owned by the Jersey Bank, \for the purpose of sustaining Jersey Bank and its credit."53 In the
exchange, the shares of stock were valued at par, when their market prices were far below that.
Other groups of investors formed networks of stakes in corporations similar to the one depicted
in ¯gure 4, including some with larger numbers of ¯rms.54 Critics and political opponents of
52Bill of complaint, 5 August 1826, Robinson v. Smith, New York County Clerk's O±ce, ref. R911. The total
authorized capital of New York Coal was $200,000.
53Bill of complaint, 29 November 1825, Smith v. Pell, New York County Clerk's O±ce, ref. S-1788. This suit was
brought by the stockholders of the Steam Saw Mill Association against the directors of the ¯rm. The total authorized
capital of Steam Saw Mill was $50,000.
54Stock ownership records and contemporary accounts by journalists indicate that Henry Eckford and a few other
investors held direct or indirect stakes in about eight companies, and a number of additional companies were controlled
by investors who may have been operating in concert with Eckford. See, especially, the New-York Enquirer, 11 July
1826.
15these men feared the power that could be wielded through control of large numbers of ¯nancial
institutions, and suspected an attempt to take over the Second Bank of the United States was
planned.55 But the pressures of the collapse in the market in late 1825 and early 1826 ultimately
proved insurmountable for these investors. In some cases, extraordinarily complex transactions
among multiple companies were conducted in order to come to the aid of failing corporations
within these investors' ownership networks.56 Journalists would later comment on the \endless
shifting of patches, to cover defects and supply de¯ciencies."57
Well before these companies actually failed, rumors of fraud among some ¯nancial ¯nancial
¯rms spread on Wall Street. Some investors demanded to have the books of the companies that
were the subject of the rumors exhibited publicly. But the directors of these ¯rms, who included
several wealthy and respected men, simply denounced the rumors as baseless and attacked the
credibility of the men responsible for spreading them.58 The charters of most of these ¯rms did not
obligate the directors to produce ¯nancial statements, and no other law required them to do so, so
they simply refused. Some of these directors o®ered assurances of the strong and improving state
of their companies' ¯nances, in some cases until days just prior to their failure.59
The month of July of 1826 saw a sudden rash of failures; Appendix table A2 presents a timeline
of the events of that month. The proximate cause of these collapses was a series of runs on the three
banks at the center of some of the networks of companies, as depositors panicked over revelations
about the ¯nancial ties between these banks and other institutions.60 Once these banks stopped
payment, the most vulnerable of the other companies failed in scenes that involved crowds of
55A character in the anonymous satirical play, Wall-Street As It Now Is (1826), describes a plan to get control of
\the nation's bank, the nation's mint and then the nation's treasury." Nicholas Biddle, president of the Bank of the
United States, made inquiries into the potential threat to control of the bank, although he ultimately concluded \I
do not think that the Bank has anything to apprehend" (14 July 1826, Nicholas Biddle Papers, Library of Congress
Micro¯lm). See also Govan (1959).
56Hilt (2009) describes a transaction in May 1826 in which the directors of Life and Fire Insurance issued an
enormous bond, which was used to purchase newly-issued shares in Morris Canal Bank, which in turn were used to
purchase a block of stock in Fulton Bank, which was given to the President of Mechanic's Insurance and ultimately
sold, in order to try to save Life and Fire Insurance.
57Commercial Advertiser, 27 October 1826.
58See, for example, the New-York National Advocate, 28 January 1825.
59For example, the July 11 issue of the New-York Enquirer states that one prominent ¯rm, Life and Fire Insurance,
had \reduced considerably" its indebtedness. This ¯rm failed exactly seven days later. Testimony in some of the
subsequent criminal trials described many public assurances of the soundness of the ¯nances of the companies; see,
for example, Barker (1827).
60The New-York Enquirer, 7 July, 1826, published a detailed description of the transaction that enabled a group of
speculators to control a signi¯cant block of stock in the Fulton Bank; on July 8 there was a run on that bank. Then
on July 17 the shareholders of the Tradesmen's bank obtained an injunction against the management of that ¯rm;
panic quickly ensued among the depositors.
16panicked investors and creditors, and some \violent struggles" at the headquarters of the ¯rms.61
In total, these ¯rms had more than $2 million in outstanding \bonds." Over the following months,
many other companies controlled by these investors failed or were shut down. Some managed to
continue to operate well into 1828 before ultimately going under; in some cases, the extent of the
companies' losses was concealed from investors for some time.62 Eventually a total of 18 NYSE
companies would fail or be shut down in 1826-29; a number of other companies whose shares were
not traded on the exchange were also touched by these events, but their fates are more di±cult to
ascertain.
3.2 Determinants of the failures
As most of the ¯rms were never required to produce regular ¯nancial statements, and few of their
accounting ledgers survive, it is impossible to systematically evaluate the practices that led to the
failures, except in the few cases where detailed records survive from criminal trials or shareholder
suits. It is possible, however, to investigate the deeper causes of the failures through an analysis of
the ownership structures of the ¯rms.
Lists of the stockholders and directors for the year 1826 for 38 of the 67 New York corporations
whose shares were traded on the NYSE were found.63 For the remaining 29 ¯rms, no stockholder
list survives in the New York State Archives.64 It should be noted that the stockholder lists simply
identify the names under which the shares were held, and may not accurately re°ect the shares
actually controlled by particular individuals. If investors were able to vote the shares of, say, family
members or close associates, the data tabulated below would understate the extent of their control.
In addition, I have assumed that any shares owned by a partnership, trust or corporation in which
an investor was a partner, trustee or director would be voted by that investor. If these shares were
61Commercial Advertiser, 18 July, 1826 and Evening Post, 2 August 1826.
62This was the case, for example, with the Franklin Bank, which failed in 1828. See Bartow (1831).
63Lists of stockholders were submitted by all New York corporations to the state comptroller pursuant to the state's
capital tax of 1823-28. These were found in various record groups in the New York State Archives associated with
the comptroller's o±ce, including A0833, A0829, and A0847. The lists of directors were found by searching New York
City newspapers from the year 1826 including the New York Evening Post, New York Enquirer, New York American,
Journal of Commerce, and the Commercial Advertiser. These were supplemented with lists of directors found in the
minute books of corporations held a the following institutions: Citigroup Archives, New York NY; SUNY Albany
Library, Albany NY; and the New-York Historical Society, New York NY. A very small number of these stockholder
lists are from years close to 1826.
64From the comptroller's records and publications, it is clear that all of the 67 ¯rms submitted ownership lists to
the state. The State of New York has not been a good custodian of its early records at times, and many important
materials have been lost or destroyed.
17Table 1:
Firm Characteristics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Ownership (N=38):
Number of shareholders 146 99 23 560
Proportion owned within New York City 0.84 0.11 0.47 1
Managerial Control (N=38):
Proportion of shares under managerial control 0.39 0.22 0.08 0.88
Direct managerial ownership 0.22 0.16 0.03 0.67
Stakes held by other corporations 0.09 0.12 0 0.46
Trusts 0.08 0.13 0 0.62
Firm Characteristics (N=67):
Firm failed, 1826-29 0.27 { 0 1
Chartered 1824-25 0.37 { 0 1
Insurance industry 0.66 { 0 1
Log authorized capital 13.06 0.65 11.92 14.51
not actually voted, then the data would overstate the extent of their control. The ownership data
were then matched to characteristics of the ¯rms, obtained from the charters.
Table A3 in the Appendix compares the characteristics of the corporations for which an owner-
ship list could be found with those that could not. The two groups of ¯rms failed at about the same
rate, and a similar proportion of each group was chartered in 1824-25. However, the ¯rms where
an ownership list could be found were much more likely to be in the insurance industry and had
smaller capitals|essentially, no list could be found for several of New York's very large banks. The
analysis that follows will therefore focus on within-industry comparisons and will control for the
size of ¯rms' capital stock. However, the validity of the inferences made from the sample depends
on the degree to which the included ¯rms are representative of the other ¯rms in their industries,
something which is di±cult to assess.
Summary statistics for the ownership structures and ¯rm characteristics are presented in table
1. The mean number of owners was just under 150, and 84% of the shares were owned by residents
of New York City. This is consistent with a fair measure of ¯nancial development; NYSE ¯rms
had clearly attracted the participation of relatively large numbers of individuals by this time. The
18Table 2:
Firm Characteristics: Failed vs. Surviving Firms
Means:
Firms that Firms that
did not fail failed P > jtj
Ownership Structure (N=38):
Proportion of shares under managerial control 0.31 0.62 0.000
Direct managerial ownership 0.20 0.29 0.144
Stakes held by other corporations 0.07 0.19 0.020
Trusts 0.03 0.13 0.004
Firm Characteristics (N=67):
Chartered 1824-25 0.29 0.61 0.014
Insurance industry 0.65 0.67 0.919
Log authorized capital 13.17 12.77 0.023
Note: P > jtj denotes the signi¯cance level of a two-sided test of di®erence in means. Firms are coded as having failed if
their shares stopped trading on the NYSE between 1826 and 1829.
mean proportion of shares under the control of the directors was relatively high, about 39%, with
22% held in the directors' own names, 9% held by other corporations on whose boards the directors
also served, and 8% held in trusts or in the name of the directors on behalf of the ¯rm. The latter
category is particularly important, because shares held in this way were not actually the property
of the directors, and therefore increased their margins of control with no corresponding increase in
their ownership. Moreover, these shares were often transferred to the company from the directors
in order to cancel a loan for the original subscription. These holdings therefore also represented a
reduction in the capital of the ¯rm.
Table 2 compares the characteristics of the ¯rms that failed to those that did not fail, and
illustrates some dramatic contrasts between the two groups of ¯rms. The directors of the ¯rms
that failed controlled 62% of the shares of their companies, exactly twice the proportion controlled
by the surviving ¯rms. With control of a majority of the votes, the management of the ¯rms
that failed was virtually unaccountable to the other stockholders. Moreover, in each of the sub-
categories of ownership, the directors of the failed companies controlled larger proportions of the
shares compared to the companies that survived. The larger stakes held via other corporations
likely indicates that the failed companies were more likely to have become part of a network of
19Table 3:
Determinants of ¯rm failure
Firm failed, 1826-29
(Mean 0.27)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportion of shares under managerial control 1.306*** 1.405***
(0.256) (0.194)
Direct managerial ownership 0.964* 1.036*
(0.487) (0.536)




Chartered 1824 or 1825 -0.138
(0.195)
Log authorized capital -0.058
(0.229)
Industry e®ects N Y Y Y
Observations 38 38 38 38
R2 0.41 0.49 0.43 0.45
The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a ¯rm's shares stopped trading during the years 1826-29. Robust
standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote signi¯cance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. A constant term (not
reported) is also included.
¯rms controlled by a group of investors. To the extent that these investors' ownership in the
corporations holding the shares was not total, these stakes created an increase in the directors
control rights relative to their ownership.65 Finally, the proportion in the shares held in trust was
also dramatically larger among the ¯rms that failed.
The ¯rms that failed were more likely to have been chartered in 1824 or 1825, and had smaller
capitalizations. This may explain some part of their high ownership concentration; one would expect
that larger ¯rms would have less concentrated ownership, and that share ownership would di®use
over time. The ¯rms that failed were not, however, any more likely to be insurance corporations
than those that survived.
These correlations are investigated further in regressions presented in table 3. These regressions
analyze the determinants of a binary indicator of ¯rm failure, and are estimated as linear probability
models. Most of the speci¯cations include industry ¯xed e®ects, and thus analyze the variation
within industries.66 All of the results in the table are consistent with the notion that the greater
65A simple model of such ownership stakes and the distinction they create between control rights and cash-°ow
rights is presented in Bebchuk et al. (2000).
66The three included industry categories are insurance, banks and loan companies|small banks forbidden from
20the proportion of shares under the control of the directors, the higher the probability of ¯rm failure.
The ¯rst two columns present estimates of the e®ect of the total proportion of shares controlled
by management, with and without industry ¯xed e®ects. The estimate in column one indicates
that a one-standard-deviation increase in this variable increased the likelihood of failure by 28%,
an amount similar to the mean failure rate. Columns three and four estimate the e®ect of the three
categories of managerial ownership separately. All three have positive e®ects on the probability of
¯rm failure, but the magnitude of the coe±cient on shares held in trust is twice as large as those
of the other two types of shares, and is highly statistically signi¯cant. The estimates imply that a
one-standard-deviation increase in shares held in trust was associated with a 30% increase in the
likelihood of failure.
Taken together, these results imply that the key to understanding the failures that began in
1826 is the ownership structures of the ¯rms. The directors of many of the failed companies
held dictatorial power over the other investors, through the control of large blocks of stock. This
control enabled them to use the resources of their ¯rms for their own purposes, and in ways that
imperiled the solvency of the ¯rms. In the worst cases, they reduced their ownership in their ¯rms
by returning their shares to the companies, while preserving their control over the ¯rms' operations
by continuing to vote the shares.
4 Impact on the law
The scandals of 1826 had a profound impact on New York's politics. In his annual message to
the New York Assembly in January 1827, Governor DeWitt Clinton discussed the \late alarming
commercial convulsions," and concluded that they \inculcate the necessity of avoiding a recur-
rence...by avoiding the causes which produced them." In addition to admonishing the legislature to
show more \circumspection" when presented with petitions for incorporations with ¯nancial priv-
ileges, he argued that \general regulations are indispensably necessary" for ¯nancial companies.
Among the measures he proposed were standards for the capital, ¯nancial statements, and liabil-
ities of ¯nancial institutions, and also regulations for \compelling the attendance and increasing
issuing notes. The ¯nal category is utilities. See table A1 in the Appendix for a list of all the companies that were
traded on the NYSE.
21the responsibility of directors" in these ¯rms.67 Later that year, the legislature enacted a sweep-
ing package of legislation that followed this broad outline. And indeed, no charters for ¯nancial
companies were granted in the 1827 session.
But outside the state government, the scandals were greeted with outrage, and the public
responded with calls for measures far harsher than mere ¯nancial regulations. Opponents of corpo-
rations in general, and of incorporated banks in particular, seized on the scandals in their rhetoric.68
Newspapers printed expressions of distrust in the governance of ¯nancial companies, such as this:
Formerly the directors of a bank knew no other duty than to facilitate the business
transactions of the city...They were stockholders and the servants of stockholders, and
they were responsible to them. Now a-days, it would seem the object in getting up a
bank, is to swindle the public.69
The possibility that these \swindlers" might escape any serious legal consequences, and would be
protected by limited liability, provoked considerable rancor. For some, the very fairness of American
society was called into question. As Niles' Register wrote,
If a negro steals a pair of shoes, away he must go to hard labor and solitary con¯nement|
but if a gentleman violates his honor and oath, and boldly plunges into the vault of a
bank or otherwise steals and carries o® 50 or 100,000 dollars belonging to widows and
orphans|he rides in a coach and eats and drinks of the best, and keeps \the best"
company. There is a great deal in being a rogue of distinction! When will these folks
be treated as they deserve? and swindling bankers and bank robbers meet the fate of
their humble, but comparatively innocent imitators, the counterfeiters of bank notes or
makers of base coin, and the pirates of Cuba?70
There were widespread calls for criminal investigations of the directors of the failed ¯rms.71 And
the public's outrage likely drove the legislature to enact regulations of a more punitive nature than
they otherwise would have.
67Assembly Documents, No. 2 (January 2, 1827), p. 9.
68For example, James K. Paulding's in°uential pamphlet Letter on the Use and Abuse of Incorporations, Addressed
to the Delegation from the City of New York (1827), published anonymously, describes the \vile deception" of the
city's ¯nancial companies (p. 38). Likewise Thomas Cooper's (1826) anti-corporate treatise on political economy
cites legislative proposals from New York in 1825 intended to regulate abuses in ¯nancial companies. Gouge's (1835)
well-known treatise advocating for a \hard money" system also discussed these scandals at length. On anti-corporate
agitation in early America, see, for example, Maier (1993).
69Evening Post, 15 July, 1826.
7012 August, 1826, p. 411. It is worth noting that the punishment for piracy was death.
71On the subject of criminal investigations, for example, the normally temperate Evening Post proclaimed \Let us
try to purify the atmosphere of these harpies, who practice upon the credulity of the ignorant and fatten upon the
spoils of the widow and orphan" (22 July, 1826).
224.1 Criminal trials
In July of 1826, Hugh Maxwell, the district attorney of New York City, began to examine the pa-
pers of the failed companies, and in August and September he obtained bills of indictment against
a number of their directors. Lacking any better alternative, Maxwell charged the defendants with
conspiracy.72 The common-law concept of conspiracy is extremely vague and expansive, and was
often used in England to suppress political dissent. This made conspiracy charges a particularly
powerful instrument for prosecutors, but these charges also risked at least the appearance of un-
fairness to the defendant in the eyes of some judges.73 Appendix table A3 lists the indictments
obtained by the District Attorney, and summarizes the outcome of the trials.
Trials were held beginning in September. The District Attorney began the with the most spec-
tacular case, that of Henry Eckford and seven other defendants, who were charged with conspiring
to defraud ¯ve di®erent corporations. This trial commenced in September 1826, and continued
through October. The District Attorney's opening statement to the packed courtroom accused the
defendants of using an extraordinarily complex series of transactions to \divert from their proper
objects the funds of the stockholders, ...[and] to employ those funds for the private uses of those
who managed the concerns."74 The defendants were represented by twelve attorneys, including
some of the most \eminent lawyers of the age," who raised numerous objections to the evidence
presented by the prosecution, and to the charges in the indictment.75 The dramatic testimony
and erudite legal argumentation of the twenty-¯ve day trial captivated the city; New York's most
prominent newspapers all printed daily accounts of the proceedings.76 Newspapers throughout the
United States printed accounts of the trial.77
The accounts of the a®airs of the companies that were presented at the trial included stunning
72The indictments charged that the defendants \did conspire, confederate, and agree...by wrongful and indirect
means, to cheat and defraud" their companies (Indictment ¯les, New York Municipal Archives, New York NY).
73Hurst (1956) discusses what he calls the \uneasiness" of nineteenth-century American judges with the crime of
conspiracy.
74Statement of District Attorney Hugh Maxwell, 27 September 1826, as reported in the New-York American's
\Supplement" containing a summary of all testimony at the trial, 21 October 1826. The trial was held in New York's
Court of Oyer and Terminer, which functioned as a criminal court with Supreme Court justices presiding.
75MacKenzie (1845: 29).
76The Evening Post, American, Commercial Advertiser, National Advocate, Enquirer and Spectator all published
near-daily accounts of the trial which included detailed summaries of the day's testimony, in spite of the admonition
of the presiding judge that the content of testimony given should not be published until the trials' completion.
77For example, in October, 1826, articles describing the criminal trials were printed in such papers as the Baltimore
Patriot, Boston Commercial Gazette, Macon Telegraph, Louisiana Advertiser, the Richmond Constitutional Way,
New Hampshire Sentinel, and Vermont Gazette, among many others.
23revelations, of pro°igate lending to ¯nance speculative investments; of companies being kept a°oat
through the fraudulent sale of securities; of absentee directors who had never bothered to inquire
about the a®airs of their ¯rms, while other directors plundered their assets; of extraordinarily
complex exchanges of securities among large numbers of companies; and of managers who had not
bothered to keep up their ¯rms' books.78 These defendants were tried three times, and in the end
some of them were found guilty.79 A few of the other indictments were also brought to trial, and
those produced some guilty verdicts as well.
But one of these verdicts was successfully appealed to the state's highest court.80 In the end,
the court felt that the indictment was so vague that it violated the principle that \every man is
entitled to a speci¯cation of the charge against him."81 E®ectively, the court rejected common-law
precedent for the appropriate standard for a conspiracy charge.82 This overturned the convictions
that had been obtained, and shut down all prosecutions of these cases.
4.2 Regulations of Financial Companies
The process of reforming the law actually began somewhat before the scandals of 1826, as legislators
learned about some of the ¯nancial practices of companies on Wall Street. In mid-1825, legislation
was passed \to prevent fraudulent bankruptcies" by prohibiting payments for stock subscriptions
in the form of notes, and making it \the duty" of the supreme court to act quickly when presented
with a complaint about unfair practices in corporate elections.83 This law may have had some
e®ect on the behavior of corporate directors, but after the crisis in 1826, it was perceived to be
totally inadequate.
78Much of the testimony is reproduced in Barker (1827).
79The ¯rst trial ended in a hung jury. This was followed by a second trial, in which the defendants were found
guilty, but the verdict was overturned on appeal, on the basis that some of the jurors were prejudiced against the
defendants by the ¯rst trial. Finally, a third trial was held, beginning in June of 1827, in which one of the defendants
was tried separately and found guilty.
80This was the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors. The members of this court include the
Supreme Court justices, the Chancellor, and the members of the Senate|and since many of the attorneys representing
the defendants in the conspiracy trials were sitting members of the Senate, they were able to vote on the case.
81Lambert v. The People, 9 Cowen 578 (N.Y. Corr. Err. 1827). The indictments contained no \bill of particulars,"
and the prosecutors simply described the transactions of the managers of the ¯rms, without speci¯cally naming the
acts that constituted the conspiracy.
82A dissenting opinion, written by Charles Stebbins, o®ers an impassioned and detailed (and nearly 50-page)
argument that the indictment was su±cient according to the standards of the common law, and in his conclusion,
he stated \The common law of England is the law of this land...whatever may be our opinions as to what the law
should be, ours is a single duty to administer it..." (p. 82).
83The act also limited corporations' indebtedness to three times their capital stock, and prohibited dividends from
being paid except out of ¯rms' pro¯ts (New York Laws, 1825, ch. 325).
24In 1827, the legislature approved the Revised Statutes of 1828, which contained major changes
to many areas of the law, and in particular added signi¯cant new legislation relative to corporate
governance. The Revised Statutes represented the outcome of an e®ort to organize and partially
codify the state's laws, which had begun a few years earlier. But the contents of the ¯nal product,
which was the ¯rst-ever such partial codi¯cation in any common-law jurisdiction, and was enor-
mously in°uential in other states, contained several provisions that were written in response to the
events of 1826.84
The Revised Statutes contain a number of regulations of ¯nancial companies and their directors
that were designed to protect the interests of the stockholders and creditors these ¯rms.85 Many
of these regulations speci¯cally prohibited the manipulations and exchanges utilized by the brokers
and speculators whose networks of companies had collapsed. For example, the ¯rst nine sections
of the title on ¯nancial corporations prohibit: exchanges of capital or securities between corpo-
rations; payments of installments on stock subscriptions in the form of securities; purchases of a
corporation's own stock, except when using pro¯ts from operations; acceptance of a corporation's
own stock as payment for debts; loans to stockholders enabling them to withdraw money paid in;
or loans to directors equivalent to more than one third of the capital stock. They also mandated
that any transfer or assignment of a corporation's property of $1,000 or more could only be made
according to a resolution of the entire board. The next sections provide for powerful enforcement
mechanisms for these provisions: they stipulate criminal penalties for any violation, and make the
directors personally liable from any losses that result from violations.
The new statutes also prohibited the holder of hypothecated shares (shares pledged as collateral
for a loan) from voting in corporate elections, and prohibited anyone from voting shares belonging to
the company or held in trust for the company. The statutes also required all ¯nancial corporations
to transmit annual ¯nancial statements to the comptroller, and included a detailed description of
the content of those statements.
Other provisions held that every corporate insolvency was to be presumed to be fraudulent,
placing the burden of proof on directors and stockholders to defeat the presumption of fraud. It
84On the process of revising the laws, and the innovations produced in New York's Revised Statutes, see Cook
(1981), Butler (1889), and Driscoll (1987).
85What follows is a discussion of Part I, Chapter 18, Title 2, Articles 1-3 of the Revised Statutes. For a lucid
summary of the provisions of the Revised Statutes, see Spencer (1830a, 1830b).
25made the directors, and then the other stockholders, personally liable for any losses in fraudulent
bankruptcies, with the total liability not to exceed the nominal amount of the shares (thus imposing
double liability). Unsurprisingly, this provision was regarded as draconian, and as one observer
noted, \responsible parties were indisposed to become directors of moneyed incorporations subject
to such a code of laws."86
Once the Revised Statutes took e®ect, in 1828, any ¯nancial corporation chartered (or having
its charter renewed) after that date was to be subject to those provisions.87 In 1828 and 1829, a
number of insurance companies were created or had their charters renewed, making them subject
to the Revised Statutes. However, no bank charters were granted or renewed in 1828.
Many of the existing banks' charters were set to expire in the years 1829-1833, and the directors
of these ¯rms hoped to avoid becoming subject to the Revised Statutes. Leading bankers recognized
the bene¯ts of somewhat stronger regulation, but regarded the terms of these statutes, in particular
the presumption of fraud in all bankruptcies, as \severities."88 The cashier of the state's largest
bank, the Bank of America, argued that all that was necessary was to regulate capital contributions,
and ensure that the entire capital of banks was paid-in and not withdrawn.89 In order to advance
their e®orts to exempt their institutions from any punitive regulations, the state's banks aided
the electoral campaigns of candidates favorable to their interests, and o®ered to fund popular
infrastructure projects.90
Ultimately, in 1829 the state enacted a completely new banking law|the safety fund law,
which created a coinsurance system among its member banks, and an administrative o±ce to
oversee and inspect them.91 The safety fund law provided that any bank chartered according to its
provisions would be exempt from the terms of the Revised Statutes that created the presumption
86Cleaveland (1857, p. xli).
87Corporate charters were regarded as contracts, so the state did not have the power to modify their terms, and
the imposition of these new regulations might be seen as the abrogation of the terms of the charters.
88Thomas W. Olcott, cashier of the Farmer's and Mechanics Bank of Albany, letter to George Newbold, cashier of
Bank of America, 20 December 1828, in George Newbold papers, New-York Historical Society, New York NY.
89\In every instance [failures] have been Banks which had but little or no original Sound Capital...any new provisions
of law should [not] regulate the conduct & operations of Banks beyond an ample & e±cient provision that the Capital
& the whole Capital incorporated should be actually paid in." George Newbold, cashier of Bank of America, letter to
Thomas W. Olcott, cashier of the Farmer's and Mechanics Bank of Albany, 17 December 1828, in George Newbold
papers, New-York Historical Society, New York NY.
90See Flagg (1868: 35-38). These e®orts began in 1827, when the stockholders of New York City's Phoenix Bank
o®ered to purchase $25,000 of the shares of the Long Island Canal Company, and loan the company $45,000 on
generous terms, in exchange for renewal of their charter without restrictions (Assembly Documents, 1827, no. 11).
91New York Laws, 1829, ch. 94. See the discussion in Bodenhorn (2003), Cleaveland (1857), and Wright (2002).
26that insolvencies were fraudulent, and that stipulated personal liability for stockholders in the case
of any fraudulent bankruptcy. In 1830, the state repealed these terms for all ¯rms (not just those
banks created under the safety fund).92 However, the safety fund banks were made subject to all
of the other terms of the Revised Statutes, as were all other subsequent ¯nancial incorporations.
4.3 Changes to the Jurisdiction of the Courts
The Revised Statutes also introduced an important change in the jurisdiction of New York's courts,
which granted stockholders and creditors, and also the state, a powerful means of pursuing claims
against corporations. In response to a petition from the attorney general with credible evidence
that a corporation was conducting transactions or businesses not authorized by its charter, the
court of chancery was given the power to issue an injunction to halt the operations of the ¯rm,
and inspect its books, remove directors, and compel directors who had misappropriated funds to
repay them.93 And for ¯nancial companies, the powers granted to the court were even broader. If
stockholders, creditors, or the attorney general petitioned the court with evidence that a ¯nancial
¯rm was acting in violation of any law, or was insolvent, the court of chancery was given the power
halt the ¯rm's operations by injunction, and to appoint a receiver to seize control of the ¯rm's
assets, collect all debts due to the ¯rm, and facilitate a \just and fair distribution of the property of
the corporation."94 The receiver was also empowered to enforce the personal liability of directors
in cases of fraud.
These provisions were interpreted by the courts as having been enacted \owing to the refusal
of the court [of chancery] to intervene" in prior cases.95 Many of the terms of the provisions were
intended speci¯cally to apply to circumstances like the ones that arose with the ¯nancial companies
that failed.
92The repeal was not retroactive; the insurance companies chartered between 1828 and mid-1830 continued to be
subject to those terms, and the safety fund banks chartered prior to mid-1830 were subject to the criminal penalty
provisions. New York Laws, 1830, ch. 71.
93The chancellor was thus given what is called \visitatorial jurisdiction" over corporations, overturning an earlier
New York precedent that it had no such jurisdiction (Attorney General v. Utica Insurance Co., 2 Johns. Ch. Rep.
371 (N.Y. 1817)). Revised Statutes, Part III, Chapter 8, Title 4, Section 31-35. Pound (1936) analyzes this statute
in the context of the evolution of the legal doctrine of equity jurisdiction.
94Revised Statutes, Part III, Chapter 8, Title 4, Section 39-50.
95Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 1 Edw. Ch. 84 (N.Y.1831).
274.4 Shareholder litigation and the derivative suit
For the shareholders and creditors of the companies that failed, the jurisdictional changes to the
court of chancery enacted by the Revised Statutes in 1828 came too late. Those measures were
intended to empower the investors or creditors of a mismanaged corporation (or the attorney
general, acting on their behalf) to use the courts to quickly shut down its operations, and recover
as much as possible from its assets. But many ¯rms had already su®ered tremendous losses and
failed by that time. And the provisions of the Revised Statutes that created the presumption of
fraud, and personal liability for directors, did not apply to those ¯rms.
The stockholders and creditors pursued their claims beginning in 1826, without the bene¯t
of the Revised Statutes. As might be expected from the failure of so many companies in such
complex circumstances, an enormous amount of litigation was initiated|one judge remarked that
\innumerable cases of frauds upon creditors, and many innocent and unsuspecting stockholders of
incorporated companies" were brought before the courts.96 Most of the litigation occurred within
the chancery courts, which had jurisdiction over bankrupt corporations. The volume of suits put
tremendous strain on the state's court system, and complaints about delays became common.97
In some of this litigation, the stockholders of the failed companies asserted the right to sue
the directors for breach of ¯duciary trust. The signi¯cance of the investors' legal strategy is that
in the doctrine of ¯duciary trust, there is a well-established principle that trustees can be held
personally liable for losses resulting from their negligence or malfeasance. The most prominent
case in which that claim was made, Robinson v. Smith, was initiated by stockholders in the New
York Coal Company, who ¯led suit against the directors of the ¯rm in August 1826, detailing the
losses that arose from the securities transactions conducted by the directors, including their ill-fated
purchase of a controlling stake in City Bank. The defendants responded that only the company
itself had grounds to ¯le the suit, since it was the company that was alleged to have been harmed.
If the defendants' argument had prevailed, it would have foreclosed any opportunity for minority
investors to pursue such claims against directors, since the directors held majority control of the
corporation.98
96Nathan v. Whitlock, 9 Paige Ch. 152. A cynical journalist remarked that these cases were \a ¯ne time for the
lawyers!" (Commercial Advertiser, 19 August 1826.)
97The Commercial Advertiser of 29 August 1826 mentions these delays.
98This is, essentially, the rule that developed in English courts. See, for example, Boyle (2002).
28Ruling in 1832, the chancellor conceded that a suit against directors for breach of trust should
be initiated by the company itself, but also recognized that if the corporation were \under the
control of those who must be made the defendants in the suit, the stockholders, who are the real
parties of interest, would be permitted to ¯le a bill in their own names."99 This established the
principle that minority investors could sue directors for a breach of ¯duciary trust. The rule in
Robinson v. Smith became a general principle of American equity jurisprudence, and marked an
important step in the development of what became known as the shareholders' derivative suit.100
4.5 The impact of the changes to the law
The regulations imposed on ¯nancial corporations in New York's laws in the years following the
scandals of 1826 had a lasting impact, both within New York State, and in other states. Although
a number of changes were introduced into New York's laws governing ¯nancial companies over
the years, as the state's administrative agencies became more sophisticated, the provisions of the
Revised Statutes governing these ¯rms remained on the books until the 1880s.101 A few other
states emulated New York by introducing similar legislation; New Jersey passed a signi¯cant law
\To prevent frauds by incorporated companies"102 in 1829 that was similar to New York's, and
Massachusetts passed a new banking law 1829 which contained some provisions that resembled
those of New York.103
The provision of the Revised Statutes that changed the jurisdiction of the court of chancery had
an enduring impact, and is invoked in hundreds of reported New York chancery cases. In particular,
stockholders in banks frequently used the provisions empowering them to seek injunctions to halt
the operations of ¯nancial companies, and to appoint a receiver to liquidate their assets, when ¯rms
violated the law or became insolvent.104 These statutes were even invoked by the shareholders of
99Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige 222 (N.Y. 1832).
100The right to sue asserted in Robinson v. Smith was not \derivative" in nature; later nineteenth-century cases
would hold that stockholders had no such individual right, but rather one that was secondary to the right of the
corporate entity itself to pursue such a claim. See Prunty (1957).
101New York (1909). The entire title regulating ¯nancial incorporations was repealed in 1882, and replaced with a
new banking law (New York Laws, 1882, ch. 402).
102Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey, 1829 (second sitting), p. 58.
103Massachusetts's banking system was quite di®erent than New York's, and much of the new law was no doubt
enacted to reform particular features of its own system. However, the 1829 law does contain provisions regulating
capital contributions, limiting loans to stockholders on pledges of their own stock, creating unlimited liability for
directors in the case of mismanagement, and imposing criminal penalties for directors using banks' capital for their
own purposes. (Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 1829, Ch. 96, p. 144.)
104Reported examples include, for example, Ferry v. Bank of Central New York, 15 How. Pr. 445 (N.Y. Sup. 1858);
29the Erie Railroad.105
The powers over corporations granted by the Revised Statutes to the state, on the other hand,
were utilized only rarely. The state did occasionally seek injunctions against banks, for example
to enforce the limits imposed on loans to insiders.106 But these laws were written at a time when
there was broad consensus that it was an important responsibility of the state to monitor the
behavior of corporations, and strictly enforce statutes that regulated their ¯nancial transactions.
For the most part, the state chose not to exercise those powers in subsequent years. Remarking
on these provisions of the Revised Statutes in 1892, one judge concluded that since stockholders
and creditors were also empowered to defend their interests, the state \left parties to their own
resources."107 Especially in the second half of the nineteenth century, the legal system became less
friendly to the interests of minority shareholders, and the restraint of corporations generally.108
And as a later commentator put it, \it was felt that corporations should be as free as possible from
state supervision."109
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed a series of failures of prominent ¯nancial companies, which had been founded
and operated by wealthy and politically in°uential men. These failures were accompanied by
scandalous revelations of mismanagement, and provoked outrage among the public. Criminal pros-
ecutions soon followed, and the government ultimately enacted a signi¯cant package of legislation
to prevent future frauds and protect investors, which was designed to improve the mechanisms of
corporate governance. As familiar as this sounds today, these events took place in 1826, and the
legal changes that resulted were some of the ¯rst ever enacted.
The panic of 1826 was one of many nineteenth century crises, each of which likely had its
own regulatory legacy. The rights enjoyed by stockholders and creditors today, and the laws
Ga®ney v. Covill, 6 Hill 567 (N.Y. Sup. 1844); and Gillett v. Moody, 3 Comst. 479 (N.Y. 1850).
105See, for example, Belmont v. The Erie Railway Co., 52 Barb. 637 (N.Y. 1869) and Ramsey v. The Erie Railway
Co., 38 How. Pr. 193. As the plainti®s could not demonstrate that the ¯rm was insolvent, they were unsuccessful. The
Revised Statutes grant the stockholders of ¯nancial companies much broader power than those of other companies.
106Bank Commissioners v. Bank of Bu®alo, 6 Paige 497 (N.Y. 1837).
107People v. Ballard, 17 L.R.A. 737 (N.Y. 1892).
108See, for example, Glaeser and Shleifer (2003).
109Pound (1936: 395). Bloch and Lamoreaux (2008) analyze the conception of business corporations as private
organizations that emerged in the eyes of the law over the nineteenth century, and the disappearance of the rationale
for state intervention in their internal a®airs that resulted.
30and institutions in place to regulate ¯nancial companies, have evolved through a process of legal
innovations in response to crises. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 represents the outcome of
the most recent step in this long process, which is as old as the country itself. Each new set of
regulations has shaped the ¯nancial innovations that followed, for better or for worse. The panic
of 2008 will almost certainly advance this process another step, as ¯nancial regulations are revised
once again.
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Chronology of Events of July and August, 1826
Date Event
6 July Jersey City Bank stops payment on its notes.
7 July New York Enquirer publishes account of fraudulent transactions be-
tween Fulton Bank, Morris Canal Bank, and Hudson Insurance.
8 July Run on Fulton Bank.
11 July New York Enquirer publishes list of ¯rms believed to be under control
of groups of speculators.
14 July U.S. Lombard and Franklin Manufacturing Company stop payment on
their bonds.
15 July Hudson Insurance Company stops payment on its bonds. Several Wall
Street brokers fail.
17 July Injunction granted against Tradesmen's Bank; panic ensues among
holders of its notes.
18 July Life & Fire Insurance Company fails.
19 July Several more brokers fail.
31 July New York Mount Hope Loan Company fails.
1 August First suits ¯led against directors of many failed companies by stock-
holders and note holders.
12 August New York District Attorney obtains the ¯rst of a series of indictments
against the directors of the failed companies.
Appendix Table A3:
Representativeness of Sample Firms
Means:
Firms with Firms with no
ownership data ownership data P > jtj
Firm Characteristics (N=67):
Firm failed 0.26 0.28 0.909
Chartered 1824-25 0.39 0.34 0.681
Insurance industry 0.84 0.41 0.000
Log authorized capital 12.87 13.32 0.005
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